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1 Readers familiar with Michael Khodarkovsky’s two previous books on the Kalmyks and
the Steppe Frontier will look forward to reading Bitter Choices. It is the story of Semën
Atarshchikov,  born  a  Chechen,  who  followed  in  his  father’s  footsteps  to  become  a
Cossack, an interpreter in at least two languages of North Caucasus highlanders, was sent
to Petersburg to join Nicholas I’s Circassian Guard (which took part in the crushing of the
Polish  uprising), became  an  officer,  returned  to  the  North  Caucasus  to  serve  under
General von Zass, the commander of the Russian forces in the northwest Caucasus, but
then deserted, returned to the Russians, deserted again, only to be killed by his Cossack
servant in 1845 at the age of thirty-eight. It is a simple story, but one made poignant by
Khodarkovsky’s  skill,  his  empathy for  the  highlanders  – like  the one he  felt  for  and
transmitted to this  reviewer for the Kalmyks – his  love of  the Caucasus,  his  growing
attachment to Cossack Atarshchikov.
2 The narrative is woven on a rich tapestry of the highlanders’ environment. We are taken
on an entire tour of the northeastern Caucasus in the company of the boy’s atalyk – a
kind of guardian – to visit the headquarters of various chieftains of the valley of the Terek
to Derbend, the Gate of Gates, on the northern border of what had become by the late
eighteenth century a Russo-Persian frontier. From there, he returned to the valley of the
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Terek, where he was born, across Daghestan and Chechnia; the bitterest fighting would
later take place there between the Russians and the highlanders. We are then introduced
to General Ermolov, who would leave an indelible imprint on Russia’s treatment of the
population, given an overview of the rebellions of the 1820s, told about Nicholas I’s visit
to the Caucasus in 1837, the disagreements over the best way to deal with the unrest, the
prevalent view that brutality and terror were the best way to cow the highlanders into
submission, and the arrival of Viceroy Vorontsov in 1845, who saw things differently. In
his conclusion Khodarkovsky seeks to explain why the Russians have failed until  the
present day to bring peace to the region. All this makes a fascinating story, and we must
be grateful to the author for telling it so well.
3 Unfortunately, it is also a one-sided book. It is an indictment of Russia’s brutal policies,
and  the  point is  well  taken,  but  it  overlooks  many  crucial  elements.  Khodarkovsky
conveys to his readers his considerable knowledge of the ethnic diversity of the region. It
will be very useful to readers, including this reviewer, but he strangely overlooks the
geographical  context.  There  were  at  least  four  regions  in  the  Caucasus:  the  north
Caucasus plain stretching to the Manych; the foothills and mountains on both sides of the
mountains, with Daghestan and Chechnia occupying the valleys and forests of the widest
spread of  the eastern Caucasus;  and the valleys of  Transcaucasia.  The fight  with the
Russians was guerilla warfare of the worst kind, in the mountains, with brutality on both
sides. One is reminded of the Balkans and Afghanistan, and the traditional hatred of the
men of the plain for those of the highlands. The Russians hated them, but so did the
Georgians, who had seen for generations of their fields devastated and their women and
children taken into slavery by parties of highlanders swooping down into the plain. A
Turkish document of the 1780s could have been written by a Russian, and there was a
Persian proverb that “the shah is a fool who wants to fight the Lezgins.”
4 Brutality and terror were the hallmarks of Russian rule, but who were the “Russians”? At
the highest level, Ermolov was a Russian, but not Rosen and Neidhardt; nor von Grabbe,
Pullo, von Stahl, Tornau. Von Zass, described by Khodarkovsky as the most brutal of them
all, was a Baltic German, who probably remembered how his ancestors in the Livonian
Order had slaughtered Estonians and Latvians in the Middle Ages in the name of Christian
civilization. He kept heads of defeated enemies for scientific studies. Khodarkovsky is
appalled.  But  the Georgians who abounded in the Caucasian Corps remembered how
General  Tsitsianov (Tsitsishvili),  the military governor of  Tiflis  and a member of  the
former Bagratid dynasty, had been treacherously murdered under the walls of Baku in
1806, and his stuffed head sent to the shah in Tehran. Bekovich-Cherkassky, a Kabardin,
whom Khodarkovsky singles out for his  murdering three hundred families in an aul,
surely remembered his ancestor who was offered hospitality by the khan of Khiva and
killed in 1717 with his three thousand men; his stuffed head was sent to the emir in
Bukhara. How many “Russian” punitive expeditions were carried out to avenge soldiers
whose throats had been slit, like those of vulgar sheep? Many of the “Russians” were in
fact  Ukrainian  Cossacks,  already  well  known  on  the  battlefields  of  Europe  for  their
brutality and rapacity. In 1743, a Cossack commander in Finland, told the Finns that, if
they did not surrender, they would be subjected to “the methods of steppe warfare,” of
which  Khodarkovsky  gives  a  good  example  on  p. 141.  Many  of  the  Cossacks  were
Ukrainians from the Left Bank Ukraine, or Turks and Persians among the Don Cossacks.
They had learned “the methods of steppe warfare,” from the Crimean Tatars. All this
should be mentioned in a discussion of Russian warfare in the Caucasus.
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5 Khodarkovsky’s conclusion is puzzling. To this reviewer, the Russians failed, and continue
to  fail,  because  they  are  fighting  a  guerilla  war  in  the  mountains.  They  failed  in
Afghanistan, and the United States is failing there as well for the same reason. Guerilla
warfare  in  the  mountains  is  not  winnable,  even  with  sophisticated  weapons.
Khodarkovsky neglects this crucial factor. His explanation is that the Russians refused to
see the North Caucasus as a colony and saw it as the inseparable part of an empire. Does
not an empire have colonies? Or is it that the Russians were building, not an empire, but a
unitary state which became an empire with the incorporation of colonies, and that they
wanted to rule them as if they were part of a unitary state? In the final analysis the
importance of the mountainous environment is crucial. The Georgians and Armenians
(and the Baltic Germans) did very well in the Russian Empire, and did not seem to have a
major problem reconciling the two identities of which Khodarkovsky makes so much. He
refers to several highlanders who found a respectable place in the political and cultural
establishment.  He gives a convincing explanation of Atarshchikov’s desertion, but,  by
reducing it to jealousy and despondency over his slow promotion, he robs his hero of a
tragic halo.
6 Could Russian expansion have stopped at  Manych? Certainly  not.  After  reaching the
foothills of the Caucasus, could it refrain from leaping over it to settle in Transcaucasia?
How were the Russians to treat the highlanders, for whom “brigandage was not a crime,”
slave trading was “the most profitable business” (p. 35, 37), and “raiding was a new way of
life”? How else could the Russians (or anyone else) continue to live in the shadow of a
climate of  endemic violence centered in the mountains? There may have been other
solutions than terror warfare, but we are not told what they could have been, and the
failure of the Raevsky policy was not encouraging. A final remark: other readers will also
miss at least a mention of the magnanimous treatment of Shamil, who was allowed to
retire under house arrest in Kaluga and leave for a pilgrimage to Mecca soon before his
death. How would the United States Army have treated a Sioux chieftain surrendering
after thirty years of bloody warfare?
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